Justice for Our Children: New Jersey Addresses
Evidentiary Problems Inherent in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases

INTRODUCTION

Child sexual abuse is a societal problem that has recently received prominent and well-deserved attention.1 Statistics demonstrate that reported incidents of child sexual abuse have increased
drastically since the 1970s and continue to increase today.2 Specifically, the number of accounts of child sexual abuse reported nationally nearly doubled between 1986 and 1989 to 386,400 cases. 3
The magnitude of the problem is even more alarming when the
estimated number of unreported cases is considered.4
I See Diana Younts, Evaluatingand Admitting Expert Opinion Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,41 DUKE L.J. 691, 693 (1991) ("Since the 1970s .. . there has
been a growing awareness of child sexual abuse .
2 Id. at 693-94.
3 Id. at 694 n.17 (citation omitted). In 1976 there were 7559 reported incidents
of child sexual abuse in the United States. Id. at 693-94. The significance of these
statistics is evidenced by the increase in reported incidents to approximately 200,000
reports made nationally ten years later. Id. at 694 (citing Linda B. Suski, Child Sexual
Abuse-An Increasingly Important Part of Child Protective Service Practice, 3 PROTECTING
CHILDREN 3 (1986)).
By 1989, the number of reports further increased to 386,400.
Id. at 694 n.17 (citation omitted); see alsoJohn E.B. Myers, The Child SexualAbuse Literature: A Callfor Greater Objectivity, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1709, 1709 (1990) (citation omitted) (noting that the American Humane Association estimated that there were
132,000 substantiated reports of child sexual abuse nationwide in 1986);Jean L. Kelly,
Comment, Legislative Responses to Child Sexual Abuse Cases: The HearsayException and the
Videotape Deposition, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (1985) (footnote omitted) (estimating that 100,000 to 500,000 children are sexually abused each year).
In 1991, there were 4022 reports of child sexual abuse in the state of NewJersey.
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(1992). Of these reported cases, 1608 were substantiated. Id. at 7.
4 See Maria H. Bainor, Note, The Constitutionalityof the Use of Two-Way Closed Circuit
Television to Take Testimony of Child Victims of Sex Crimes, 53 FoRDHAM L. REv. 995, 996
(1985) (citations omitted) (noting that "experts agree that incidents of child molestation are greatly underreported"). Experts believe that the incidents of child sexual
abuse that are actually reported are but a fraction of actual incidents. See, e.g., ROBERT
L. GEISER, HIDDEN VICTIMS-THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 9 (1979) (estimating
that for every reported case of child sexual abuse, two to three cases go unreported);
Suzanne M. Sgroi, Sexual Molestation of Children: The Last Frontierin Child Abuse, in THE
SEXUAL VIc-IMOLOGY OF YOUTH 25, 27 (Leroy G. Schultz ed., 1980) (maintaining that
the number of reported incidents of child sexual abuse represent a fraction of actual
incidents of abuse).
There are a number of reasons why sexually abused children may not report
incidents of abuse. See Bainor,supra,at 996 n.3. Children may feel that adults will not
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The increase in reports of sexual abuse has brought to the
forefront the evidentiary problems inherent in the prosecution of
child sexual abuse cases.5 In these situations, the prosecution's
case often turns upon the testimony of the child.6 The child victim's account of the alleged acts of abuse is usually the best and, at
times, the only evidence that the child was sexually abused because
there are seldom any outside witnesses to the alleged acts of abuse
or any physical evidence of abuse.7 Furthermore, parents are often
reluctant to expose their children to the trial procedure because
they believe that their children will be further traumatized through
participation in the legal process.'
This Comment focuses on the steps that the New Jersey judiciary and legislature have taken to address the special issues and
problems posed by child sexual abuse cases.9 Part I of this Comment examines the use of closed circuit television to take the testimony of the child witness outside of the courtroom. In Part II, the
adoption of a new hearsay exception that specifically addresses the
out-of-court statements of child victims of sexual abuse is discussed.
Part III analyzes the admissibility of expert testimony concerning
the credibility of a child's allegations of abuse by comparing the
child's behavior to those symptoms commonly found in child victims of sexual abuse. Finally, this Comment concludes that an
analysis of the major statutes and cases pertaining to evidentiary
issues in child sexual abuse cases demonstrates a successful balancbelieve them or may be uncertain as to whether the act is wrong. Doris Stevens &
Lucy Berliner, Special Techniques for Child Witnesses, in THE SEXUAL VIrIMOLOGY OF
YOUTH 246, 251 (Leroy G. Schultz ed., 1980). Also, very young children may be un-

able to understand and/or to communicate that they have been abused. Bainor,
supra, at 996 n.3 (citations omitted).
5 See State v. D.R., 109 N.J. 348, 362, 537 A.2d 667, 674 (1988); see also Mike McGrath & Carolyn Clemens, The Child Victim as a Witness in Sexual Abuse Cases, 46 MONT.
L. REv. 229, 230-31 (1985) (citations omitted) (listing the problems that arise in the
prosecution of child sexual abuse cases). For a discussion of State v. D.R, see infra
notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
6 D.R, 109 N.J. at 358, 537 A.2d at 672 (citing State v. R.W., 104 N.J. 14, 16, 514
A.2d 1287, 1287-88 (1986)).
7 See id. at 358-59, 537 A.2d at 672 (citing NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR
CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 30, 36 (1982)

[hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION]); Lucy Berliner
& Mary Kay Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40J. Soc. IssUEs
125, 129 (1984).
8 See Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 7, at 127.
9 For an overview of reforms that focus on solutions to the problems inherent in
child sexual abuse prosecutions, see Josephine Bulkley, Introduction: Background and
Overview of Child Sexual Abuse-Law Reforms in the Mid-1980's, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 5

(1985).
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ing of the interests of victims and their families, the state's interest
in prosecuting child sexual abuse, and the constitutional rights of
defendants.
I.

THE USE OF CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION TO ALLOW CHILD
WITNESSES TO TESTIFY OUTSIDE OF THE COURTROOM

Problems in prosecuting child sexual abuse cases often stem
from the victim's fear of being in close proximity to the accused
molester.' This fear may negatively impact the reliability of a
child's testimony." Moreover, parents may choose not to put a
child through the trauma of testifying in an open courtroom.' 2
Recognizing these problems, commentators have determined that
the courts need-to establish procedures and utilize settings that offer support and comfort for the child witness who is a victim of
3
sexual abuse.1
One solution to the problems resulting from the child witness's fear and anxiety is to allow the testimony of the child witness
to be given outside of the courtroom and out of the presence of
the accused.' 4 Generally, there are two ways in which state statutes
provide for the taking of a child witness's testimony outside of the
open court. 1 5 First, some states permit the child witness's testimony to be videotaped and later presented to the jury.' 6 A second
10 Bainor, supra note 4, at 997-98 (citing Jacqueline Y. Parker, The Rights of Child
Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEw ENG. L. REv. 643, 651, 652
(1982)) (other citations omitted).
11 See id. (citations omitted).
12 See Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 7, at 128. Once the trial has begun, it is
difficult for parents to rescind a complaint of child sexual abuse even if they believe
that their child is being further traumatized as a result of the trial process. See Bainor,
supra note 4, at 997 n.6 (citation omitted). This is because the state's interest in prosecuting child sexual abuse is considered to be greater than the interest of parents in
avoiding the further traumatization of their child. Id. This policy, however, may serve
as a deterrent to parents' pursuing complaints of sexual abuse. Id.
13 See Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 7, at 136; Parker, supra note 10, at 668-70.
14 See Bainor, supra note 4, at 1003-05 (citations & footnotes omitted). Other alternative methods of taking a child victim's testimony may also work to ease the trauma
of the testifying experience. Id. at 1003-04 (citations omitted). For example, the
child may be seated in a way that obscures the child's view of the accused. Id. at 100405 (citations omitted). Also, the court may set up a "child courtroom" where the jury,
defendant, and spectators observe the victim's testimony through a one-way glass. Id.
at 1003 n.42 (citation omitted).
'5 See id. at 1004-05 (citations omitted); Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 7, at 130.
16 See ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1993); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(B)
(1989); Au& CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West
Supp. 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-401.3 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 3511 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1993); HAw. R. EvID. 616(a) &
(b); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14(2) (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558(2)
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approach allows the child's testimony to be taken outside of the
courtroom via closed circuit television. a7 New Jersey employs this
second technique.1 8 New Jersey Statutes Annotated section
2A:84A-32.4 allows children to testify via closed circuit television in
certain cases, including child sexual abuse cases, if the witness is
sixteen years old or younger and if the trial court finds that there is
a substantial chance that the child will suffer severe emotional distress if compelled to testify in open court.1 9
(1986); Ky.

REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); MICH. COMP.
§ 600.2163a(5) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West
1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-407 (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.680 (Vernon
Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-402 (1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 174.227
(Michie 1992); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-917 (Michie 1984); OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (A) (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 753(C) (West 1992); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5984 (Supp. 1993); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-116 (Supp. 1993);
TEX. CODE CrIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071(2) (West Supp. 1994); VT. R. EVID. 807(d);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7) (West Supp. 1993); Wvo. STAT. § 7-11-408 (1993).
New Jersey does not have a statute specifically permitting the use of videotaped
depositions in child sexual abuse cases, but does have a statute permitting a child
sexual abuse victim's testimony to be taken outside of the courtroom via closed circuit
television. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1993). The NewJersey State
Assembly deleted language in the statute that would have permitted videotaped testimony of child witnesses. Id. (Senate Judiciary Committee Statement). The assembly
reasoned that the use of closed circuit television most effectively handled the problem
of having child witnesses testify while safeguarding the defendant's constitutional
rights. Id.
For an analysis and discussion of statutes allowing videotape depositions of child
victims of sexual abuse, see Kelly, supra note 3, at 1041-43; Note, The Testimony of Child
Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv. L. REv. 806, 81316, 822-26 (1985) [hereinafter Testimony of Child Victims].
17 See ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1993); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (1990); ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(A) (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1994);
4
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5 -86g (West Supp. 1993); Fi.
STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West
Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (1990); HAw. R. EvID. 616(d); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-3024A (Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A-14(1) (West 1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-1558(1) (1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421-350(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
LAWS ANN.

1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC.

§ 9-102 (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West 1988); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 13-1405 (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. CRIM.
PROc. LAw § 65.10 (McKinney 1992); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(C) (Anderson
1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753(B) (West 1992); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985
(Supp. 1993); TEX. CODE CrIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071(3) (West Supp. 1994); VT. R.
EVID. 807(e); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (Michie 1988).
18 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1993).
19 Id. Specifically, § 2A:84A-32.4 provides in pertinent part:
a. In prosecutions for aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, criminal sexual contact, or child
abuse, or any action alleging an abused or neglected child.., the court

may, on motion and after conducting a hearing in camera, order the
taking of the testimony of a witness on closed circuit television at the
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Testimony by closed circuit television addresses the problems
posed by children's fear of the accused molester and the trauma of
the legal process in general. 20 Such a solution, however, may interfere with defendants' constitutional right to confront their accusers, as afforded by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. 21 In Mayland v. Craig,22 the United States Supreme
Court established guidelines to determine the constitutionality of
statutes allowing child witnesses to testify outside of the defendant's presence. 23 The Craig Court initially determined that the
trial, out of the view of the jury, defendant, or spectators upon making
findings as provided in subsection b. of this section.
b. An order... may be made only if the court finds that the witness
is 16 years of age or younger and that there is a substantial likelihood
that the witness would suffer severe emotional or mental distress if required to testify in open court. The order shall be specific as to whether
the witness will testify outside the presence of spectators, the defendant,
the jury, or all of them and shall be based on specific findings relating
to the impact of the presence of each....
d. The defendant's counsel shall be present at the taking of testimony in camera. If the defendant is not present, he and his attorney
shall be able to confer privately with each other during the testimony by
a separate audio system.
Id. The Senate Judiciary Committee noted that the purpose behind this provision was
to spare young witnesses the ordeal of having to repeatedly discuss the details of sexual abuse. Id. (Senate Judiciary Committee Statement).
20 See Bainor, supra note 4, at 1003-05 (citations omitted).
21 See id. at 1005 (citations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted
with the witness against him"). In early decisions interpreting the Confrontation
Clause, the United States Supreme Court identified the rights afforded by this clause
as having two aspects. See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895). First, the Court asserted, the Confrontation
Clause entitles the defendant to a face-to-face meeting with the witnesses against him
at trial. Kirby, 174 U.S. at 55; Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244. Second, the Court declared, the
defendant is entitled to cross-examine his accusers. Kirby, 174 U.S. at 55; Mattox, 156
U.S. at 244. Although the Court continues to acknowledge that the Confrontation
Clause affords defendants both of these rights, the Court has also recognized that a
defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1985) (noting that "[tihe Confrontation Clause includes no
guarantee that every witness for the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony
that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion"). Specifically, the Supreme
Court has stated that certain circumstances may warrant courts to dispense with faceto-face confrontation. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (citations omitted)
(stating that "[t]he Court, however, has recognized that compelling interests... may
warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial").
22 497 U.S. 836 (1990). For a detailed discussion of Maryland v. Craig,see Theresa
Cusick, Note, Televised Justice: Toward a New Definition of Confrontation Under Maryland
v. Craig, 40 CAH.U. L. REv. 967 (1990).
23 See Craig,497 U.S. at 855-57. In Craig,the United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a Maryland statute that permitted alleged victims of child sex-
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Confrontation Clause does not guarantee defendants an absolute
right to confront witnesses face-to-face. 24 The Court asserted that
the primary concern of the Confrontation Clause is to subject the
testimony of witnesses against the defendant to stringent testing in
the context of an adversarial proceeding. 25 In Craig, the United
States Supreme Court held that the use of a procedure allowing a
child victim to testify outside of the defendant's presence is justified by the state's "sufficiently important" interest in protecting
child victims of sexual abuse from the traumatic effects of testify26
ing, so long as the state makes a sufficient showing of necessity.
The Court asserted that an adequate showing of necessity requires
that the trial court determine, in each case, that the use of the
procedure is necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child witness, that the child would be traumatized by the defendant's presence, and that the emotional
trauma suffered by the child would
27
be greater than deminimiS.
ual abuse to testify via closed circuit television. Id. at 840-41, 860. This statute required that the trial court first determine whether the child victim would suffer severe
emotional distress if compelled to testify in the courtroom. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 9-102 (Supp. 1993). See infra note 32 for the text of § 9-102 and a comparison of its application with New Jersey's closed circuit television statute.
The state accused Craig of sexually abusing a six year old child. Craig,497 U.S. at
840. The prosecution attempted to invoke a Maryland statutory procedure that permitted a child victim of sexual abuse to testify via closed circuit television upon a
determination that the child would suffer severe emotional distress if compelled to
testify in court. Id. at 840-41. The trial court found that the procedure did not violate
Craig's Sixth Amendment right to confront her accuser. Id. at 842 (citation omitted).
This decision was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but the Court of
Appeals of Maryland reversed. Id. at 843 (citations omitted).
24 Craig,497 U.S. at 849-50. The Court stated that the Confrontation Clause signifies a preference for a face-to-face confrontation between the defendant and the witness
against the defendant, and that this preference must sometimes give way to public
policy considerations and the necessities of the particular case. Id. at 849 (quoting
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63; Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243).
25 Id. at 845. The purposes of the Confrontation Clause, the CraigCourt stated,
are served by four elements of confrontation that combine to ensure that the evidence admitted against a defendant is reliable and submitted to the rigorous adversarial testing characteristic of criminal proceedings in the Anglo-American system. Id.
at 846 (citations omitted). The four elements noted by the Court are the witness's
oath, the witness's physical presence, the cross-examination of the witness, and the
observation of the witness's demeanor by the trier of fact. Id.
26 Id. at 855.
27 Id. at 855-56 (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court refused to
second-guess the state's judgment concerning the importance of protecting victims of
child abuse from the trauma of testifying. Id. at 855. The Court recognized that the
state has a "transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children" that is bolstered by the growing body of literature documenting the psychological trauma endured by victims of child abuse who must testify in the courtroom. Id. (quoting
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968)) (other citations omitted).
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The constitutionality of NewJersey Statutes Annotated section
2A:84A-32.4 was specifically addressed by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in State v. Crandall.28 The court determined that the statute
is constitutional on its face because it complies with the requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Craig.29 In

Crandall, the court found that the constitutional rights of defendants are adequately protected by the statutory requirement that a
hearing be conducted to determine whether testimony via closed
circuit television is necessary to protect the welfare of a child witness. ° Such a hearing protects defendants' rights, the court explained, because section 2A:84A-32.4 requires that the trial court
find that the child's emotional distress would be both severe and
caused by the defendant's presence in the courtroom rather than
by the courtroom scene in general. 3 '
In fact, section 2A:84A-32.4 achieves the most precise balance
28 120 N.J. 649, 653, 577 A.2d 483, 484-85 (1990). The State of New Jersey convicted Richard Crandall of endangering the welfare of a child, sexual assault, and
aggravated sexual assault. Id. at 651, 577 A.2d at 484. At Crandall's trial, the child
victim was permitted to testify by closed circuit television under § 2A:84A-32.4. Id.
Crandall appealed on the basis that the procedure authorized by the statute deprives
defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. Id.
29 Id. at 651, 655-56, 577 A.2d at 484, 486. The court also held that expert testimony is not required to establish that the child witness would suffer severe emotional
distress if forced to testify in the presence of the defendant. Id. at 661, 577 A.2d at
488. The statute, the court observed, does not mention any need for expert testimony. Id. The court also noted that the majority ofjurisdictions with similar statutes
have determined that the testimony of experts is not an absolute requirement in justifying the use of the procedure. Id. at 662, 577 A.2d at 489 (citations omitted). In
addition, the Crandall court pointed out that factors, other than expert testimony,
that may establish that the child witness will suffer severe emotional distress as a result
of testifying in open court include: (1) the child had a pre-existing mental condition
rendering him or her child particularly susceptible to severe emotional distress; (2)
the defendant was an authority figure in the child witness's life; (3) the offense alleged is especially heinous; (4) a dangerous weapon or instrument was used in the
commission of the offense; (5) the sexual abuse was ongoing and occurred over an
extended period of time; (6) the defendant inflicted serious bodily harm upon the
child; (7) the defendant threatened to harm the child or another person if the child
reported the incident; (8) the child has been a victim of abuse previously; or (9) the
defendant had ready access to the child or was financially supporting the child. Id. at
663, 577 A.2d at 490 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b) (West Supp. 1994); N.Y.
ClM. PROC. LAW § 65.20(9) (McKinney 1992)).
30 Id. at 656, 577 A.2d at 486 (citations omitted).
31 Id. at 655-56, 577 A.2d at 486 (citations omitted). In dicta, the court stated that
if the child witness fears the defendant only, and not the jury, the trial court should
still use a procedure which allows the child to testify outside of the courtroom, unless
the defendant requests that the child witness testify in the presence of the jury. Id. at
658, 577 A.2d at 487. The court added that if the defendant insists that the child
testify in the presence of the jury, she must execute a valid and knowing waiver of her
right to be present in the courtroom. Id. at 659, 577 A.2d at 487 (citation omitted).
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possible between the constitutional rights of defendants and the
state's interests in protecting child victims of sexual abuse and in
prosecuting child sexual abuse cases.3 2 The statute meets the
threshold requirements set forth in Craig without going beyond
them to give defendants more protection than the Constitution
mandates.3 3 As a result, the chance that a child witness will be further traumatized is greatly reduced.3 4 Furthermore, the problems
in prosecuting child sexual abuse cases arising from the child's fear
of the accused molester are effectively alleviated without
trammel35
defendants.
of
rights
constitutional
the
upon
ling
32 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1993). Section 2A:84A-32.4 may
be compared with the Maryland statute held constitutional in Craig. See MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-102 (Supp. 1993); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855-57
(1990) (holding that § 9-102 meets the constitutional standards under the Confrontation Clause). The pertinent text of § 9-102 states as follows:
(a) Conditions.-Ina case of abuse of a child ... a court may order that
the testimony of a child victim be taken outside the courtroom and
shown ...

by means of closed circuit television if:

(1) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(2) The judge determines that testimony ... in the defendant's presence will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress ....
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 9-102 (Supp. 1993). It should be noted that both

the Maryland statute and § 2A:84A-32.4 require that the trial judge determine that the
child witness will suffer from severe emotional distress if compelled to testify in the
presence of the defendant. See id.; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4(b) (West Supp.
1993).
Sections 9-102 and 2A:84A-32.4 should also be contrasted with a similar Pennsylvania provision. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985 (Supp. 1993). Section 5985
states in pertinent part: "(a) Closed-circuit television.-The child victim or material witness... may move, for good cause shown, that the testimony of a child be taken in a
room other than the courtroom and televised by closed-circuit equipment. . .

."

Id.

Section 5985, in contrast to the "severe emotional distress" requirements of the New
Jersey and Maryland statutes, only mandates that the prosecution show "good cause"
for taking a child witness's testimony outside of the courtroom via closed circuit television. Compare id. ("[T]he court may, for good cause shown, order the taking of a videotaped deposition .

. . .")

(emphasis added) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4(b)

(West Supp. 1993) ("An order... may be made only if the court finds ...that there is
a substantial likelihood that the witness would suffer severe emotional or mental distress if required to testify in open court.") (emphasis added) and MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD.
PROC. § 9-102 (Supp. 1993) ("[A] court may order that the testimony of a child victim
be taken outside the courtroom . . . if . . . [t]hejudge determines that testimony by
the child . . . will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress. . . .") (emphasis

added). It is unlikely that this "good cause" standard would meet the constitutional
requirement of "necessity" as set forth in Craig. See Craig,497 U.S. at 855-57 (citations
omitted).
33 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-57; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1993).
See supra notes 23-27 (detailing the Craigrequirements for constitutionality).
34 See Bainor, supra note 4, at 1003-05 (citations omitted).
35 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-57; Bainor, supra note 4, at 1018.
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HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS DIRECTED PRIMARILY TOWARD OUT-OFCOURT STATEMENTS MADE BY CHILD VICTIMS OF SEXUAL

ABUSE
The problem of getting a child victim's testimony before the
jury is not solved by taking testimony via closed circuit television if
the child is disqualified or not able to testify because of emotional
distress, fear, or severe shyness. 3 6 In such cases, the hearsay statements of the child are extremely valuable to the prosecution's
case. 7 Commentators have urged that states adopt hearsay exceptions expressly addressing children's out-of-court statements concerning sexual abuse.3 8 Many states, including New Jersey, have
enacted rules recognizing the need for such special hearsay
exceptions.39
36 See McGrath & Clemens, supra note 5, at 234.
37 See Bainor, supra note 4, at 1001-02 (citations omitted).

Hearsay is defined as a
"species of testimony given by a witness who relates, not what he knows personally, but
what others have told him, or what he has heard said by others." BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 722 (6th ed. 1990). Testimonial statements that are not subject to crossexamination are excluded under the hearsay rule. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALs AT COMMON LAw § 1370, at 55 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. vol. 1974). The
theory behind the rule is that the test of cross-examination will bring to light any
existing inaccuracies and untrustworthiness in a witness's assertions. Id. § 1420, at
251. Thus, exceptions to the hearsay rule are centered around two circumstances: (1)
where the cross-examination process is deemed superfluous due to a high probability
of trustworthiness; and (2) where the test of cross-examination is impossible to apply.
Id. The traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule are: statements against interest,
dying declarations, attestation of a signatory witness, statements about family history,
various statements of deceased persons, entries made in the ordinary course of business, official statements, reputation, sundry commercial documents, learned treatises,
affidavits, assertion of a mental condition, statements by a voter, and spontaneous
exclamations. Id. § 1426, at 257.
38 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 3, at 1054 (concluding that challenges to hearsay exceptions specifically addressing out-of-court statements of child sexual abuse victims
should be rejected); Testimony of Child Victims, supra note 16, at 826 (stating that there
is a clear need for new approaches to children's testimony in sexual abuse cases, such
as hearsay statutes).
39 See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1989); ARK. R. EVID. 803(25); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1228 (West Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024
(1987); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PRoc. § 9-103.1 (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 595.02(3) (West 1988); MIsS. CODE. ANN. § 13-1-403 (Supp. 1993); N.J.R.E.
803(c) (27); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West Supp. 1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5985.1 (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 19-16-38 (Supp. 1992); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West Supp. 1993).
Under the "fresh complaint" rule, the New Jersey judiciary has admitted testimony stating that the victim complained of a sexual assault. See State v. Hill, 121 N.J.
150, 151, 578 A.2d 370, 371 (1990). Such testimony, the Hill court ruled, may be
admitted for the purpose of negating any inference arising from the victim's silence
about the abuse. Id. at 151-52, 578 A.2d at 371. The NewJersey Supreme Court has
considered the issue of whether a statement concerning sexual abuse made by a child
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In State v. D.R.,40 the New Jersey Supreme Court proposed a
modification of the hearsay rules to allow the admission of out-ofcourt statements made by the victims of child sexual abuse. 41 The
court proposed this hearsay exception in an effort to enable the
judicial system to manage the evidentiary problems inherent in
during questioning qualifies under this "fresh-complaint" rule. See State v. Bethune,
121 N.J. 137, 139, 578 A.2d 364, 365 (1990). The Bethune court recognized that flexibility is necessary in applying the "fresh-complaint" rule to children's complaints alleging acts of sexual abuse because children are often too embarrassed and afraid to
talk about such acts. Id. at 144, 578 A.2d at 367. Yet the court held that statements
directly responding to coercive questions are not admissible as a "fresh-complaint."
Id. at 145, 578 A.2d at 367. The court then listed factors that should be employed to
determine if the questioning preceding the complaint of sexual abuse was coercive:
the child's age, the nature of the relationship between the child and the interviewer,
the circumstances surrounding the questioning, the nature of the questions asked,
whether the discussion was initiated by the child, and the specificity of the questions
asked. Id., 578 A.2d at 368.
Detailed testimony concerning the victim's statements, the Bethune court asserted, is not admissible under the "fresh-complaint" rule because the purpose of the
rule is only to prove that the victim complained of the sexual assault. Id. at 146, 578
A.2d at 368. Details of the victim's statements, however, may be admissible under
Rule of Evidence 63(33). See N.J. Evid. R. 63(33), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A (West
Supp. 1993).
40 109 N.J. 348, 537 A.2d 667 (1988). The defendant in D.
appealed from convictions of endangering the welfare of a child, sexual assault, and aggravated sexual
assault. Id. at 351, 537 A.2d at 669. In this appeal, the D. court confronted the issue
of "the admissibility of the child's out-of-court account of the sexual assault." Id. The
New Jersey Supreme Court used this case as an opportunity to consider the need to
create a special exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 358-63, 537 A.2d at 672-75.
41 Id. at 363, 537 A.2d at 675. The rule proposed by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in D.R. read in pertinent part:
1. Rule 63 shall be amended to read as follows .... Evidence of a statement offered to prove the truth of the matter stated which is made
other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible except as provided in Rules 63(1) through
63(33).
2. A new rule to be designated as Rule 63(33) shall be adopted to read
as follows ... A statement made by a child under the age of 12 relating to a sexual offense.., committed on, with, or against that child is
admissible in a criminal proceeding ... if (a) the proponent of the
statement makes known to the adverse party his intention to offer
the statement and the particulars of the statement at such time as to
provide him with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it; (b) the
court finds, in a hearing ... that on the basis of the time, content,
and circumstances of the statement there is a probability that the
statement is trustworthy; and (c) either (i) the child testifies at the
proceeding, or (ii) the child is unavailable as a witness and there is
offered admissible evidence corroborating the act of sexual abuse;
provided that no child whose statement is to be offered in evidence
pursuant to this rule shall be disqualified to be a witness in such proceeding by virtue of the requirements of paragraph (b) of Rule 17.
Id. app. at 378, 537 A.2d app. at 682-83.
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child sexual abuse prosecutions.4 2 A child victim's account of an
act of sexual abuse made spontaneously in an out-of-court setting,
the court noted, may be highly credible because of its content and
the context in which it is made.43 The New Jersey Supreme Court
contrasted these hearsay statements with the in-court testimony of
child witnesses, which is often adversely affected by the defendant's
presence, the stressful atmosphere of the courtroom, and the prosecution's use of leading questions.4 4
The proposal made by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State
v. D.R. was adopted by the legislature in 1989 as Rule of Evidence
63(33).4 Rule 63(33) is a hearsay exception that allows the admission of out-of-court statements made by a child below the age of
twelve under the following circumstances: (1) when the defendant
is given fair notice that the statement will be offered and of its particulars; (2) when the court finds that the statement is trustworthy;
and (3) when the child either testifies or is unavailable to testify,
and there is admissible corroborating evidence of the alleged act of
42 Id. at 363, 537 A.2d at 675. The court noted that commentators have almost
universally agreed that a modification of the hearsay rules-aimed at admitting into
evidence the reliable out-of-court statements of child victims-is necessary because of
the particular limitations on the accessibility of evidence in child sexual abuse cases.
Id. at 362, 537 A.2d at 674 (citing Glen Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions for a Child's
Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 46-48 (1984); Judy Yun, Note, A
Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv.
1745, 1763-66 (1983); Testimony of Child Victims, supra note 16, at 826-27)); see also
Kelly, supra note 3, at 1054 (stating that constitutional challenges to such hearsay
exceptions should be rejected because the exceptions are a constitutionally sound way
of protecting child victims from the trauma resulting from in-court testimony); JoEllen S. McComb, Comment, Unavailability and Admissibility: Are a Child's Out-of-Court
Statements About Sexual Abuse Admissible if the Child Does Not Testify at Trial, 76 Ky. L.J.
531, 565-67 (1988) (concluding that a child victim's reliable hearsay statements
should be admitted when the child is unavailable to testify or deemed incompetent to
testify).
43 D.R, 109 N.J. at 359, 537 A.2d at 673. The supreme court noted that young
children will sometimes relate incidents of sexual abuse to a trusted adult in a matterof-fact manner because children, having little knowledge of sexual matters, do not
consider a sexual encounter to be unpleasant or shocking. Id. at 359-60, 537 A.2d at
673 (citing Yun, supra note 42, at 1756; Testimony of Child Victims, supra note 16, at 81718 n.80). Commentators have determined, the court further recognized, that a child
victim's account of acts of sexual abuse are often highly reliable. Id. at 360, 537 A.2d
at 673 (citing Skoler, supranote 42, at 44-45; RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL
INTERVENTION, supra note 7, at 35).
44 Id. (citing Yun, supra note 42, at 1751-52; Skoler, supra note 42, at 6).
45 See id. app. at 378, 537 A.2d app. at 682-83; N.J. Evid. R. 63(33), N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A (West Supp. 1993). Since the enactment of Rule 63(33), the New Jersey
Rules of Evidence have been revised and the text of Rule 63(33) has been re-enacted
almost verbatim in newly-adopted Rule 803(c) (27). See NJ.R.E. 803(c) (27). For the
text and a discussion of Rule 803(c) (27), see infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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abuse.4 6
These hearsay exceptions, however, are potentially in conflict
with the rights of defendants under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.47 The United States Supreme Court, in Idaho v.
Wright,4" set forth the constitutional standards for hearsay exceptions that allow admission of children's out-of-court statements
concerning acts of sexual abuse.4 9 In Wright, the Court held that
such hearsay statements are not admissible under the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause unless certain requirements
are met.5 ° Specifically, the Court asserted that the Sixth Amend46 N.J. Evid. R. 63(33), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A (West Supp. 1993). Rule of Evidence 63(33) stated in pertinent part:
A statement by a child under the age of 12 relating to a sexual offense
... committed on, with, or against that child is admissible in a criminal
proceeding brought against a defendant for the commission of such offense if (a) the proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse
party his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the
statement at such time as to provide him with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it; (b) the court finds, in a hearing conducted pursuant to
Rule 8(1), that on the basis of the time, content, and circumstances of
the statement there is a probability that the statement is trustworthy;
and (c) either (i) the child testifies at the proceeding, or (ii) the child is
unavailable as a witness and there is offered admissible evidence corroborating the act of sexual abuse; provided that no child whose statement is to be offered ... shall be disqualified to be a witness in such
proceeding by virtue of the requirements of paragraph (b) of Rule 17.
Id. Paragraph (b) of Rule 17 provided that a witness is disqualified if he or she is
incapable of comprehending a witness's duty to be truthful. N.J. Evid. R. 17, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A (West 1976). When a child witness was disqualified from testifying because he or she could not comprehend the duty of a witness to tell the truth,
Rule 63(33)'s exception to the hearsay rule did not apply. See N.J. Evid. R. 63(33),
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A (West Supp. 1993). Moreover, Rule 63(33) specifically allowed for admission of a child's hearsay statements in criminal proceedings. Id. The
New Jersey judiciary, however, held Rule 63(33) to be applicable in civil cases as well.
R.S. v. Knighton, 125 N.J. 79, 100, 592 A.2d 1157, 1167 (1991); M.P. by D.P. v. Wee
Care Day Nursery, 250 N.J. Super. 119, 124, 593 A.2d 799, 802 (App. Div. 1991).
47 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Skoler, supra note 42, at 14; Testimony of Child Victims,
supra note 16, at 809-13.
48 497 U.S. 805 (1990). An Idaho court convicted Wright of two counts of lewd
conduct with a minor. Id. at 805. The court, pursuant to the state's residual hearsay
exception, admitted the testimony of a physician concerning statements about sexual
abuse that one of the child victims had made to the physician. Id. at 809-12. Wright
appealed, and the state supreme court reversed the conviction, finding that the admission of the physician's testimony violated Wright's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Id. at 812.
49 See id. at 814-15 (citations omitted).
50 Id. While the Court has recognized that the Confrontation Clause and hearsay
rules are generally intended to preserve similar values, the Wright Court observed, the
Court has not equated the prohibitions of the Confrontation Clause with the general
rule forbidding the admission of hearsay statements. Id. at 814 (citing California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970) (citations omitted); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
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ment requires that the declarant must testify at the trial, or the
prosecution must demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable to
testify, and that the statement must bear "adequate indicia of
reliability."5
The Supreme Court elaborated on the issue of the reliability
of a hearsay statement, holding that a showing of "adequate indicia
of reliability" may be satisfied under two circumstances: (1) where
the statement falls within the scope of an established hearsay exception; or (2) where the statement is supported by "a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 52 The Court further
explained that "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" must
be demonstrated from the circumstances surrounding the statement and must characterize the declarant as worthy of belief.5"
The evidence must be so trustworthy, the Court asserted, that little
would be added to its reliability through the cross-examination
process. 4
The passage of Rule 63(33) pre-dates the Wright decision, but
an analysis of this rule demonstrates that it adheres to the constitutional standards set forth in Wright.5 5 The first constitutional re86 (1970) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,
393 n.5 (1986) (citation omitted)).
51 Id. at 814-15 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (citations omitted)).
The Court stated that Roberts sets forth the "general approach" for ascertaining when
an incriminating statement, admissible under a hearsay exception, also meets Confrontation Clause requirements. Id. at 814 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65). The Court
then explained that the scope of admissible hearsay is restricted by the Confrontation
Clause in two distinct ways. Id. (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65). First, the Court
stated, the Confrontation Clause requires the prosecution to either produce the declarant or demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable to testify. Id. (quoting Roberts,
448 U.S. at 65). Second, the Court continued, the statement of an unavailable witness
is admissible only if it exhibits adequate "indicia of reliability." Id. at 814-15 (quoting
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66).
52 Id. at 815 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66) (other citations omitted).
53 Id. at 819. This conclusion, the Court stated, is derived from the rationale underlying the exceptions to the general rule against the admission of hearsay statements. Id. The Court noted that the general rule against hearsay is based on a theory
that sources of untrustworthiness and inaccuracy may best be exposed by cross-examination, but cross-examination may be considered superfluous where it is sufficiently
clear that the evidence offered is unlikely to be inaccurate or untrustworthy. Id.
(quoting 5 WiGMORE, supra note 37, § 1420, at 251).
54 Id. at 821 (citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 (1986); State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d
197, 204 (Wash. 1984) (en banc)). The Court concluded that the Confrontation
Clause requires the exclusion of an out-of-court statement "unless an affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in which the statement was made, provides a basis
for rebutting the presumption that a hearsay statement is not worthy of reliance at
trial." Id.
55 See N.J. Evid. R. 63(33), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A (West Supp. 1993). See supra
note 46 (providing the relevant text of Rule 63(33)).
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quirement of Wright, that the witness testify at trial or is unavailable
to testify, 56 was addressed in 63(33)(c).Y This section expressly
provided that a child's hearsay statements will be inadmissible unless the child testifies at the trial or is unavailable to testify.5" The
second constitutional requirement set forth in Wright, that the
statement be supported by "adequate indicia of reliability," 59 was
addressed in 63(33) (b). 6' This provision maintained that a child's
hearsay statements will be inadmissible unless the court finds it
probable that the child's statement was trustworthy. 6 Furthermore, the rule required that this determination of trustworthiness
be based upon the time, circumstances, and content of the statement. 62 This qualification is in accord with the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Wright that the trustworthiness of hearsay statements is to be judged on the basis of the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement.6 3 Thus, Rule 63(33)
embodied all of the constitutional requirements for the admission
of hearsay statements set forth by the Supreme Court.6 4
Cases interpreting Rule 63(33) have added to the understanding of how to apply the hearsay exception addressing children's
out-of-court statements concerning acts of sexual abuse. 65 Particularly, the New Jersey judiciary has addressed the issue of what
makes a child victim's hearsay statement "trustworthy" for the purposes of Rule 63(33).66 First, in State v. M.Z.,6 7 the law division
56 Wright, 497 U.S. at 814.
57 See N.J. Evid. R. 63(33) (c), NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A (West Supp. 1993). Rule of
Evidence 63(33) (c) specifically required that "either (i) the child testifies at the proceeding, or (ii) the child is unavailable as a witness and there is offered admissible
evidence corroborating the act of sexual abuse." Id.
58 Id.
59 Wight, 497 U.S. at 814-15.
60 See N.J. Evid. R. 63(33) (b), NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A (West Supp. 1993).
61 Id. Rule 63(33) (b) required that "the court finds, in a hearing pursuant to Rule
8(1), that on the basis of the time, content, and circumstances of the statement there
is a probability that the statement is trustworthy." Id.
62 See id.
63 Wright, 497 U.S. at 819.
64 See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Wright.
65 See infra notes 67-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
66 See, e.g., State v. C.H., 264 NJ. Super. 112, 124, 624 A.2d 53, 59 (App. Div. 1993)
(setting forth factors that relate to the credibility of a child's hearsay statement)
(quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 821-22 (citations omitted)); State v.J.G., 261 NJ. Super.
409, 421, 619 A.2d 232, 238 (App. Div. 1993) (finding that the court may not consider
other evidence at trial in determining the trustworthiness of a child's hearsay statement), cert. denied, 133 NJ. 436, 627 A.2d 1142 (1993); State v. M.Z., 241 NJ. Super.
444, 450, 575 A.2d 82, 85 (Law Div. 1990) (positing that admissibility under Rule
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held that "trustworthy" is not equivalent to "credible. ' 68 The court
explained that the admissibility of a child's hearsay statements
under Rule 63(33) is dependent upon the trial court's finding that
there exists some indicia of reliability resembling those found in
other hearsay exceptions.6 9 Additionally, in State v. C.H.,70 the appellate division set forth a list of factors that relate to the issue of
whether a child's hearsay statement is reliable." In this list, the
court included the consistent repetition of allegations of sexual
abuse, the spontaneity of the statement, the child's mental state at
the time the statement was made, the lack of any motive to fabricate allegations of sexual abuse, and the use of terminology that is
uncommon for a child of the declarant's age and maturity.7 2 Finally, in State v. JG.,73 the appellate division held that a child's
hearsay statement must be reliable by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, and therefore the trial court may not consider corroborating evidence in reaching a determination that a child's
63(33) requires a finding of indicia of reliability resembling those found in other
hearsay exceptions).
67 241 N.J. Super. 444, 575 A.2d 82 (Law Div. 1990). The child victim in this case
made statements to her mother concerning the actions of the defendant. Id. at 44749, 575 A.2d at 84. The court held that these statements were properly admitted
under Rule 63(33) because the statements were spontaneous and not prompted, and
as such were "trustworthy." Id. at 451, 575 A.2d at 86.
68 Id. at 449, 575 A.2d at 85. In explaining its interpretation of "trustworthy," the
law division noted that witnesses whose credibility is doubtful are often permitted to
testify in court, and that the credibility of a witness is a matter for the jury to decide.
Id. at 449-50, 575 A.2d at 85. The court then asserted that the combination of the
witness's first-hand knowledge and oath to tell the truth create sufficient evidence of
"trustworthiness" to allow the jury to decide "credibility." Id. at 450, 575 A.2d at 85
(citing State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506, 251 A.2d 442, 446 (1969)). In contrast, the
court noted, when hearsay statements are involved, the issue becomes more complicated and it is necessary that there exist some other evidence of "trustworthiness." Id.
69 Id. For a list of the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule, see supra note 37.
70 264 N.J. Super. 112, 624 A.2d 53 (App. Div. 1993). In this case, the trial court,
pursuant to Rule 63(33), admitted into evidence statements made by an eight year old
victim to family members, a caseworker, two physicians, and a police detective. Id. at
117-19, 624 A.2d at 56. The appellate division held that the evidence presented at the
pretrial hearing supported the trial court's findings and conclusions as to the admissibility of the victim's hearsay statements. Id. at 124, 624 A.2d at 59.
71 See id. (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821-22 (1990)).
72 Id. (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 821-22).
73 261 N.J. Super. 409, 619 A.2d 232 (App. Div. 1993), cert. denied, 133 N.J. 436, 627
A.2d 1142 (1993). In JG., the state convicted the defendant of aggravated sexual
assault and endangering the welfare of a child. Id. at 414, 619 A.2d at 234. The
appellate division found that the trial court erred in considering in its determination
of trustworthiness the defendant's confessions and other evidence corroborating sexual abuse. Id. at 421, 619 A.2d at 238. The court, however, found this to be harmless
error and held that the trial court's admission of the hearsay statements was supported by other identified circumstances. Id. at 421-22, 619 A.2d at 238-39.
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7 4

hearsay statements are "trustworthy."

Another issue that has been addressed by the NewJerseyjudiciary is the question of what constitutes an "unavailable" witness
under Rule 63(33).'- In State v. Roman,7 6 the appellate division
held that a witness will not be considered "unavailable" for the purposes of Rule 63(33) unless the prosecution demonstrates that it
exercised due diligence in attempting to procure the child witness
whose hearsay statements are sought to be admitted.7 7 In State v.
Maben,7" the New Jersey Supreme Court also considered the issue
of what comprises an "unavailable" witness for the purposes of Rule
63(33). 7 9 To balance the defendant's right to confront his or her
accusers with the state's need to prosecute child sexual abuse cases,
the Maben court held that the state must adhere to the requirements of good faith, due diligence, and reasonableness in its efforts to procure a missing witness before hearsay evidence will be
74 Id. at 421, 619 A.2d at 238; see also State v. Roman, 248 N.J. Super. 144, 152, 590
A.2d 686, 690 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that the reliability of a child's hearsay statement must be determined from the totality of circumstances surrounding its
declaration).
75 See State v. Maben, 132 N.J. 487, 501-02, 626 A.2d 63, 71 (1993); Roman, 248 N.J.
Super. at 148-50, 590 A.2d at 688-89.
76 248 N.J. Super. 144, 590 A.2d 686 (App. Div. 1991). In this case, the court
determined whether the child victim, whose hearsay statements were admitted pursuant to Rule 63(33), was "unavailable as a witness." Id. at 148, 590 A.2d at 688. Because the prosecutor failed to exert due diligence in procuring the child victim's
testimony, the court held, the law division erred in finding that the child victim was
unavailable to testify. Id. at 149-50, 590 A.2d at 688-89 (citations omitted).
77 Id. at 149, 590 A.2d at 688-89 (citations omitted). Specifically, the Roman court
held that the prosecutor did not exercise due diligence because he failed to establish
that it would be futile to resort to the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses (Interstate Compact). Id. at 149-50, 590 A.2d at 688-89. The Interstate Compact, the appellate division stated, is available to procure a child witness's appearance
at trial so long as the requirements of the statute are satisfied. Id. at 149, 590 A.2d at
688 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-19 (West 1976) (summoning witness in NewJersey
to testify in another state)). The court noted that the victim's mother's refusal to
honor a subpoena, in itself, was not sufficient to establish that it would have been
futile to utilize the Interstate Compact. Id. The appellate division recognized that
difficulties arise in securing the appearance of child witnesses when parents refuse to
cooperate, but the court observed that the Interstate Compact, the appointment of a
guardian, and the contempt power are all remedies that may be employed to insure
compliance by deviant parents. Id. at 149-50, 590 A.2d at 688-89.
78 132 N.J. 487, 626 A.2d 63 (1993). In Maben, the child victim moved from New
Jersey, and the state failed to check a potential address in Florida that was contained
in the records of the Division of Youth and Family Services. Id. at 493, 626 A.2d at 66.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that the prosecution had exercised due diligence
in its efforts to locate the child witness. Id. at 491, 626 A.2d at 65. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, however, affirmed the decision of the appellate division, holding that
the prosecution failed to prove that it had exercised due diligence in its efforts to find
the child witness. Id. (quotation omitted).
79 Id. at 501-02, 626 A.2d at 71.
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admitted.8" The supreme court further noted that the possibility
of a formidable search is not sufficient to justify a failure to proceed past cursory threshold inquiries into the witness's
whereabouts.8 1
Finally, in State v. M.Z.,8 2 the law division considered the matter of who may testify under Rule 63(33).83 Rule 63(33), the M.Z.
court held, is not limited to statements made to expert witnesses.8 4
The court maintained that the New Jersey Supreme Court did not
intend that the application of the hearsay exception proposed in
State v. D.R. 85 be limited to statements made to psychologists and
other experts.8 6
It should be noted that Rule 63(33) has been re-enacted as
Rule 803(c) (27) under the new New Jersey Rules of Evidence.8 7
80 Id. at 501, 626 A.2d at 71. At a minimum, the court noted, the trial court must
employ a balancing test that examines the burden on the state in conducting a
search, the burden on the accused if he or she is unable to confront the missing
witness, the gravity of the offense committed, and the existence of corroborating evidence. Id. at 501-02, 626 A.2d at 71. The Maben court recognized that this requirement may impose an additional burden upon the state, but the fact that the
defendant's constitutional rights are at issue requires that the state prove the witness
to be truly unavailable before hearsay statements will be admitted into evidence. Id. at
502, 626 A.2d at 71.
81 Id. at 496, 626 A.2d at 68.
82 241 N.J. Super. 444, 575 A.2d 82 (Law Div. 1990). See supra notes 67-69 and
accompanying text for further discussion of State v. M.Z.
83 M.Z., 241 N.J. Super. at 451, 575 A.2d at 86.
84 Id. The court held that statements about acts of sexual abuse made by the victim to a police detective were admissible under Rule 63(33). Id.
85 109 N.J. 348, app. 378, 537 A.2d 667, app. 682-83 (1988). For a discussion of the
hearsay exception proposed in State v. D.1, see supra notes 40-44.
86 M.Z., 241 N.J. Super. at 451, 575 A.2d at 86.
87 See NJ.R.E. 803(c)(27). Rule 803(c) (27) provides in pertinent part:
Statements by a child relating to a sexual offense.
A statement by a child under the age of 12 relating to sexual misconduct committed with or against that child is admissible in a criminal,
juvenile, or civil proceeding if (a) the proponent of the statement
makes known to the adverse party his intention to offer the statement
and the particulars of the statement at such time as to provide him with
a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it; (b) the court finds ...that on
the basis of the time, content and circumstances of the statement there
is a probability that the statement is trustworthy; and (c) either (i) the
child testifies at the proceeding, or (ii) the child is unavailable as a witness and there is offered admissible evidence corroborating the act of
sexual abuse; provided that no child whose statement is to be offered in
evidence pursuant to this rule shall be disqualified to be a witness in
such proceeding by virtue of the requirements of Rule 601.
Id.
The legislature has proposed Rule 804(b) (8), a rule of evidence concerning the
hearsay statements of child witnesses regarding acts of sexual abuse that differs
slightly from Rule 63(33). See id. cmt.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A (West Supp. 1993)
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The requirements of Rule 803(c) (27) are identical to those of Rule
63(33).88 The only material difference between the two provisions
is that Rule 803(c) (27) is expressly permitted for use in juvenile,
criminal, and civil proceedings.8 9
New Jersey's hearsay exception that is primarily directed toward statements of child sexual abuse victims, as it has been applied by the state's judiciary, reflects a careful balancing of the
state's interest in prosecuting child sexual abuse and the constitutional interests of defendants.9 t On the one hand, under this exception to the hearsay rule, the state is able to effectively manage
the obstacles that arise from the inherent evidentiary problems associated with child sexual abuse cases. 9 ' When the requirements of
the rule are satisfied, the state may admit into evidence the out-ofcourt statements of the victim that are often the best and only evidence that an act of sexual abuse has taken place.9 2 On the other
hand, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his or
her accuser is adequately protected by the rule's criteria that ensure that the victim's statements possess manifestations of reliability such that testing in an adversary proceeding would add little to
their credibility.9 3

(to be codified at NJ.R.E. 804(b)(8)) (proposed May 17, 1993). Proposed Rule
804(b) (8) differs from Rule 803(c)(27) in three substantial ways. Compare id. with
NJ.R.E. 803(c) (27). First, Rule 804(b) (8) would not allow the admission of hearsay
statements of a declarant who can give testimony at trial regarding the substance of
the out-of-court statement. N.J.R.E. 803(c) (27) cmt. Second, it would not be limited
to sexual abuse cases. Id. Finally, Rule 804(b) (8) would apply only to children of
"tender years" and not to all children under the age of 12. Id. The legislature declined to include this significantly-altered provision in its revision of the evidence
rules in response to objections advanced by the NewJersey State Bar Association and
the Attorney General's office. Id. Future amendments to Rule 803(c) (27), however,
are anticipated. Id.
88 Compare N.J.R.E 803(c) (27) with N.J. Evid. R. 63(33), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A
(West Supp. 1993). See supra note 46 for the text of Rule 63(33) and supra note 87
for the text of current Rule 803(c) (27).
89 See NJ.R.E. 803(c) (27). Although Rule 63(33) did not expressly apply to civil
proceedings, cases interpreting the scope of the rule held that it was applicable in
civil cases. See R.S. v. Knighton, 125 NJ. 79, 100, 592 A.2d 1157, 1167 (1991); M.P. by
D.P. v. Wee Care Day Nursery, 250 N.J. Super. 119, 124, 593 A.2d 799, 802 (App. Div.
1991).
90 See State v. Maben, 132 N.J. 487, 496, 626 A.2d 63, 68 (1993) (citing U.S. CONST.
amend. VI; N.J. CONST. art. I,
10).
91 See McGrath & Clemens, supra note 5, at 234.
92 See State v. D.R., 109 N.J. 348, 358-59, 537 A.2d 667, 672 (1988) (citing RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION, supra note 7, at 30, 36).
93 See N.J.R.E. 803(c) (27); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821 (1990).
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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE THAT SPEAKS TO

THE ISSUE OF THE CREDIBILITY OF A CHILD'S ALLEGATIONS OF
SEXUAL ABUSE BY COMPARING THE CHILD'S BEHAVIOR

TO THOSE SYMPTOMS COMMONLY OBSERVED
IN CHILD VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE

Many of the evidentiary problems plaguing child sexual abuse
prosecutions arise from the central role played by expert witnesses
in such cases.9 4 The credibility of expert witnesses often affects the
outcome of child sexual abuse cases, and if the truth-seeking purpose of the trial is to be accomplished it is imperative that the expert testimony offered be reliable.9" The use of expert testimony
in child sexual abuse prosecutions becomes particularly problematic when it infringes upon other interests. 96 For example, the expert testimony may invade the domain of the jury, may be unduly
prejudicial, may improperly bolster the credibility of the child witness, may create a situation where one witness judges the credibility
of another witness, or may lead to a "battle of experts."9 7 Such
situations often arise when the expert testimony in question concerns psychological evidence that attempts to compare a child's behavior to those symptoms commonly found in victims of child
sexual abuse. 98
94 Younts, supra note 1, at 697.
95 Id. at 698. Courts need to carefully consider the reliability of such expert testimony prior to admitting this testimony into evidence because investigations of child
sexual abuse are sometimes inadequately conducted and may lead to a misdiagnosis
of abuse. Id. at 692 (citation omitted).
96 Veronica Serrato, Note, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions:A Spectrum of Uses, 68 B.U. L. REV. 155, 156-57 (1988).
97 Id. (citing State v. Lindsey, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (Ariz. 1986); State v. Moran, 728 P.2d
248, 251-52 (Ariz. 1986); State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Iowa 1986)).
98 See id. at 163-67 (placing expert testimony used in child sexual abuses cases into
a spectrum of admissibility based upon its impact on the ultimate issue of the case).
One type of expert testimony employed in child sexual abuse cases is testimony
that describes behavior commonly observed in victims of child sexual abuse. SeeJohn
E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REv. 1, 51
(1989). Such testimony has two possible uses. See id. First, it may be offered as substantive evidence of abuse. Id. Second, it may be offered as rehabilitative evidence to
explain behavior that appears to be inconsistent with the child's allegations of sexual
abuse. See id. It is this second category of expert testimony that is the focus of Part III
of this Comment.
Expert testimony that concerns psychological evidence may be contrasted to expert testimony that pertains to medical evidence of sexual abuse. See id. at 48 (citations omitted). The latter is usually admissible. Id. Expert medical witnesses have
been allowed to offer opinions as to the origin of the victim's injuries, to establish
whether penetration occurred, and to answer inquiries concerning whether the accused's explanation for an injury is reasonable and whether the victim's injuries could
have occurred in a particular manner. Id. at 49 (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed the issue of the
admission of such expert psychological testimony in State v. J.Q99
The specific issue presented to the J.Q. court involved the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), which embodies characteristics that
are commonly observed in children who have been victims of sexual abuse.'0 0 The court held that CSAAS evidence is admissible
only to explain that a victim's behavior, which may appear to be
inconsistent with allegations of abuse, may actually be compatible
with abuse because such behavior is commonly observed in victims
of child sexual abuse. 10 1 CSAAS evidence, the court continued,
may not be used as substantive evidence of abuse, and an expert is
not permitted to give an opinion as to whether the child was sexuAnother area of expert testimony concerns the admissibility of inferences drawn
by experts from the child's interaction with anatomically-correct dolls during investigative questioning. See State v.J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 566, 617 A.2d 1196, 1202-03 (1993);
Younts, supra note 1, at 706. The admissibility of such evidence is highly questionable
because the dolls have not been shown to be dependable indicators of sexual abuse.
Younts, supranote 1, at 706. The New Jersey judiciary has not yet addressed this issue,
but the supreme court has questioned the admissibility of such testimony in dictum.
SeejQ., 130 N.J. at 566, 617 A.2d at 1202-03. The court noted, however, that the use
of anatomically-correct dolls may help a child in recounting the event in a way that
will help the jurors to better understand the event in question. Id. at 566, 617 A.2d at
1203.
99 130 N.J. 554, 556, 617 A.2d 1196, 1197 (1993).
100 Id. The state's expert witness, Dr. Madeline Milchman, offered testimony
describing the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). Id. at 558,
559, 617 A.2d at 1198, 1199. Dr. Milchman then related the specific behaviors embodied in CSAAS to behavior that she observed in the victims, and on this basis she
stated that in her expert opinion, she believed that the victims had been sexually
abused. Id. at 559, 617 A.2d at 1199.
For detailed information concerning the research and theory behind CSAAS, see
Roland C. Summit, MD., The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983). Dr. Summit, a prominent physician and professor of
psychiatry, identified CSAAS as incorporating five symptoms that are commonly observed in victims of child sexual abuse: (1) helplessness; (2) secrecy; (3) delayed, unconvincing, and conflicting disclosure; (4) entrapment and accommodation; and (5)
retraction. Id. at 181. Dr. Summit described CSAAS in order to provide a "common
language" for persons who work to protect child victims of sexual abuse and dispel
common myths and misconceptions about the behavior of children who have been
sexually abused. Id. at 179-80, 191; see Myers et al., supra note 98, at 67 (citing Summit, supra, at 181). CSAAS was not intended to be used as a device to help diagnose
abuse. Id.
101 SeejQ., 130 N.J. at 579, 617 A.2d at 1209 (quoting Myers etal., supra note 98, at
67-68 (footnotes omitted)). The court noted that CSAAS helps to explain why many
victims of child sexual abuse delay reporting acts of abuse and later recant their allegations of sexual abuse. Id. (quoting Myers et al., supra note 98, at 67-68 (footnotes
omitted)). Confining the use of CSAAS to its rehabilitative functions, explained the
court, permits CSAAS to further "a useful forensic function." Id. (quoting Myers et
al., supra note 98, at 67-68 (footnotes omitted)).
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ally abused based upon a comparison of the child's behavior to 10the
2
behavior commonly observed in victims of child sexual abuse.
The New Jersey Supreme Court based its ruling in J. Q upon
03
an analysis of the purposes for which CSAAS was developed.1
The court stated that CSAAS was not developed as a diagnostic device, but instead the syndrome assumes that sexual abuse has already occurred and then explains how victims react to that
abuse."0 4 The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that CSAAS
has not been accepted as a reliable indicator of abuse, and for this
reason CSAAS testimony should not be utilized to establish guilt or
innocence. 0 5 The court, however, did recognize that CSAAS has
been accepted in the scientific community as a means of identifying and describing behavior commonly found in victims of child
sexual abuse. 0 6 For this reason, the court held, CSAAS testimony
may properly be used to rehabilitate the victim's testimony by ex102 Id. at 582, 617 A.2d at 1211 (citing Myers et al., supra note 98, at 68.) The court
stated that CSAAS does not purport to establish child sexual abuse, but is useful in
explaining "traits often found in children who have been abused." Id. The court
asserted that the state was asking CSAAS "'to perform a task it could not accomplish.'"
Id. (quoting Myers et al., supra note 98, at 68). The court explained that while the
scientific community appears to accept the clinical theory that CSAAS portrays behavioral traits often found in victims of child sexual abuse, the scientific community has
not accepted that the existence of such symptoms in a particular individual proves
abuse. Id. at 573, 617 A.2d at 1206 (citations omitted).
103 See id. at 578-81, 617 A.2d at 1209-10 (citations omitted). The court noted that
Dr. Summit developed the theory behind CSAAS in order to improve the child's
health, to ensure that abused children receive adequate treatment, and to guarantee
that misconceptions about child sexual abuse victims would not impair society's response to those victims. Id. at 568, 617 A.2d at 1203. CSAAS, the court concluded,
does not attempt to prove that children exhibiting the described symptoms have been
sexually abused. Id. at 582, 617 A.2d at 1211.
104 Id. at 579, 617 A.2d at 1209 (quoting Myers et al., supra note 98, at 67-68).
CSAAS may be distinguished from Battered Child Syndrome (BCS), which is a device
used to diagnose physical abuse. See Myers et al., supra note 98, at 67. BCS is probative of abuse because it is used to connect the cause of an injury to the type of injury.
Id. In contrast, CSAAS assumes the presence of sexual abuse and then attempts to
explain commonly-observed reactions to such abuse and is therefore not probative of
sexual abuse. Id. Professor Myers concluded that the confusion stemming from the
use of CSAAS evidence arose because some professionals mistakenly transferred their
knowledge of BCS to CSAAS. Id. (citation omitted).
105 j.Q, 130 N.J. at 578, 617 A.2d at 1209 (citing David McCord, Expert Psychological
Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 24, 38 (1986)).
The court noted that CSAAS was not intended to diagnose sexual abuse, but instead
assumes that abuse has occurred and attempts to explain why child victims react in
particular ways. Id. at 579, 617 A.2d at 1209 (quoting Myers et al., supranote 98, at 6768 (footnotes omitted)).
106 Id. at 573, 617 A.2d at 1206 (citing Myers et al., supra note 98, at 66-69; Chandra
L. Holmes, Comment, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Curingthe Effects of a
Misdiagnosis in the Law of Evidence, 25 TuLsA LJ. 143, 158-59 (1989)).
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plaining that it is common for victims of child sexual abuse to react
in ways that may appear inconsistent with their allegations of
07
abuse. 1
In State v. Michaels,' the appellate division clarified the issue
of whether expert testimony concerning CSAAS is admissible when
the expert does not expressly offer an opinion as to whether a particular child was sexually abused.10 9 Although the prosecution's expert did not explicitly state her opinion as to the issue of abuse, the
Michaels court held, her testimony was inadmissible because it was
intended to imply such an opinion." 0 The testimony, the court
noted, was not focused on explaining why the victims would act in
a manner seemingly inconsistent with abuse, but was instead aimed
at informing the jury that the symptoms that the expert witness
107 Id. at 579, 617 A.2d at 1209 (citing Myers et al., supra note 98, at 68). The New
Jersey Supreme Court noted that the use of CSAAS testimony that it advocated in JQ.
is in accord with the use that is generally granted to Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS).
Id. at 581, 617 A.2d at 1210. The court explained that RTS describes symptoms that
victims of rape often experience and, like CSAAS, RTS was developed as a therapeutic
tool rather than a diagnostic device. Id.; see also People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 298,
301 (Cal. 1984) (concluding that RTS testimony is not admissible as evidence that a
rape occurred, but may be admissible in cases where the defense suggests that the
victim's behavior after the alleged rape is not consistent with her allegations of rape);
State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230-31 (Minn. 1982) (holding that RTS testimony
may not be admitted for the purpose of proving that a rape actually occurred); People
v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 138 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that RTS is not admissible as
substantive proof that the victim was raped) .
The court also equated the advocated use of CSAAS testimony to expert evidence
concerning Battered Woman's Syndrome (BWS). JQ., 130 NJ at 574, 617 A.2d at
1206-07 (citing State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 190-97, 478 A.2d 364, 369-73 (1984)). The
Kelly court explained that BWS evidence is admissible to allow jurors to overcome
common misconceptions that battered women would leave the men who batter them,
and that such evidence does not aid jurors in determining whether or not a defendant behaved in a certain manner on a particular occasion. Kelly, 97 N.J. at 204, 478
A.2d at 377.
108 264 N.J. Super. 579, 625 A.2d 489 (App. Div. 1993). This is the high-profile case
of Margaret Kelly Michaels, the teacher accused of sexually abusing 20 children under
her care at Wee Care Nursery School in Maplewood, NewJersey. Id. at 585, 625 A.2d
at 492.
109 See id. at 603, 625 A.2d at 501-02. The defendant's appeal raised the argument,
among others, that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony concerning
CSAAS. Id. at 587-88, 625 A.2d at 493. The court determined that the expert testimony did not attempt to explain the children's inconsistent behavior, but rather attempted to compare the children's behavior with CSAAS. Id. at 603, 625 A.2d at 501.
110 Id. at 603-05, 525 A.2d at 501-02. The appellate division based its decision on
the NewJersey Supreme Court holding in JQ. Id. at 599, 625 A.2d at 499 (citingj.Q,
130 N.J. at 579-80, 617 A.2d at 1209-10). The court reiterated that when CSAAS testimony is used, the expert is expected to testify that the victim's specific behavior, while
appearing inconsistent with sexual abuse, may be consistent with such abuse; the expert should not render an opinion as to whether a particular child has been sexually
abused. Id. (citingJQ, 130 N.J. at 579-80, 617 A.2d at 1209-10).
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observed in the children were consistent with behavior commonly
observed in victims of child sexual abuse.1 1 1
The New Jersey judiciary has taken the most fair and reasonable approach in its position on the admissibility of expert evidence that attempts to compare the victim's behavior to common
symptoms found in victims of child sexual abuse. 1 2 Many commentators support the decision that the court made in JQ, rejecting the use of CSAAS to prove abuse and advocating its use to
explain how victims often react to sexual abuse in ways that appear
inconsistent with their allegations of abuse.1 13 Also, the courts of
111 Id. at 603, 625 A.2d at 501. Determining that the harm caused by the admission
of this expert testimony could not have been undone by cross-examination, the
Michaels court held that the impact of the error of admitting this testimony was "so
overwhelming" that the defendant's convictions could not stand. Id. at 605, 625 A.2d
at 502.
112 See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text (examining the approach the
New Jersey judiciary has taken with regard to the admissibility of expert psychological
evidence in child sexual abuse cases). The New Jersey judiciary, in setting forth the
standards for compelling examinations of child witnesses, has also taken a fair and
reasonable approach that is intended to protect the child. See State v. D.R.H., 127 N.J.
249, 260-61, 604 A.2d 89, 95 (1992) (holding that a physical examination of a child
witness in a sexual abuse case may be compelled only when the defendant sufficiently
demonstrates that the examination can produce competent evidence having substantial probative worth, and only when the court is satisfied that the possible adverse
consequences to the child witness are clearly outweighed by the defendant's need);
State v. R.W., 104 N.J. 14, 22-23, 514 A.2d 1287, 1291 (1986) (holding that in compelling psychological examinations of child witnesses in sexual abuse cases, there is no
need to deviate from accepted criteria for determining "substantial need," and that
age per se cannot be the basis for ordering psychiatric or psychological testing).
113 See, e.g., Marian D. Hall, The Role of Psychologists as Experts in Cases Involving Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 451, 463 (1989) (explaining that behavioral
science research does not support the conclusion that there is a way to accurately
diagnose that a particular child is a victim of sexual abuse); McCord, supra note 105,
at 67 (concluding that the admissibility of expert opinion testimony should be limited
to explaining the unusual behavior of the complainant); Myers et al., supra note 98, at
68 (noting that expert testimony concerning the common behaviors observed in victims of child sexual abuse is necessary to instruct jurors on the common misconceptions that surround child sexual abuse and to explain the seemingly self-impeaching
behavior of victims of child sexual abuse); Andrew Cohen, Note, The Unreliability of
Expert Testimony on the Typical Characteristicsof Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 CEo. L.J. 429, 447
(1985) (finding that testimony that speaks to typical characteristics of victims of child
sexual abuse misleads juries and should be excluded); Holmes, supra note 106, at 16062 (concluding that CSAAS is not a scientifically reliable method of detecting child
sexual abuse because the causal connection between CSAAS and abuse is not verifiable due to the fact that it is "impossible to manipulate the variables involved") (citations omitted); Corrine A. LaCroix, Recent Case, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 1214, 1219
(1993) (praising the JQ. court's decision because "[a]lthough the defense can impeach the credibility and attack the reasoning of the psychologist, the sheer impact of
experts testifying could sway the jury in favor of the prosecution"). But see Elizabeth
V. Baker, Comment, Psychological Expert Testimony on a Child's Veracity in Child Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions,50 LA. L. REv. 1039, 1055 (1990) (asserting that experts should be
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many states have followed the same approach as the New Jersey
Supreme Court in admitting expert testimony concerning behavior
1 14
commonly observed in sexually abused children.
permitted to render opinions as to children's veracity in sexual abuse prosecutions
where the expert is sufficiently experienced and explains the methods behind the
opinion given).
One commentator has listed four serious problems that argue against the use of
syndrome evidence as substantive evidence of abuse: (1) a child who has not actually
been abused may believe that he or she has been abused; (2) even if the child has
actually been abused at some other time, this does not establish that the accused
abused the child on the date in question; (3) the syndromes lack a firm scientific
foundation because they are based upon clinical intuition rather than hard data; and
(4) the symptoms that have been observed in abused children can be the result of a
number of other traumatic events that are not related to sexual abuse. See DEBRA
WHITCOMB, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, WHEN THE VICTIM Is A CHILD

116 (2d ed.

1992).
114 See State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 254 (Ariz. 1986) (asserting that expert testimony comparing a child's behavior with that of child sexual abuse victims is admissible to explain why recantation is not inconsistent with the occurrence of abuse);
People v. Bowker, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886, 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (ruling that CSAAS
evidence is "admissible solely for the purpose of showing that the victim's reactions as
demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested");
Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 273, 274 (Del. 1987) (holding that expert testimony
regarding typical patterns of behavior in child sexual abuse victims is admissible to
demonstrate that the complainant's behavior is not inconsistent with the alleged sexual abuse); State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154, 1156-57 (Me. 1988) (holding inadmissible
expert witness testimony identifying the complainant as an abuse victim based on a
comparison to sexual abuse victims); People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (Mich.
1990) (holding that evidence concerning the behavioral patterns commonly observed
in sexual abuse victims is admissible only to rebut an inference that the complainant's
actions were inconsistent with allegations of abuse); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604,
610 (Minn. 1984) (citation omitted) (holding that expert testimony concerning commonly observed behaviors in child sexual abuse victims is only admissible to demonstrate that the child's behavior is not inconsistent with typical reactions to sexual
abuse); State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Or. 1983) (holding that an expert
witness may not give an opinion as to whether a child witness is credible, but may
describe the reactions of typical child sexual abuse victims to explain the child witness's inconsistent behavior).
The Pennsylvania judiciary has taken the most conservative position on this issue
and will not permit expert testimony concerning the common behavior of sexually
abused children to be admitted for any reason, even for the purpose of rehabilitation.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sees, 605 A.2d 307, 308-09 (Pa. 1992) (finding error in
permitting expert testimony concerning commonly observed behaviors of sexual
abuse victims); Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 834 (Pa. 1992) (citation and
footnote omitted) (holding that testimony concerning behavior commonly observed
in victims of child sexual abuse is inadmissible).
Other states have allowed the admission of expert opinion as to whether a particular child has been sexually abused. See Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212, 220 (Fla.
1988) (holding that an expert witness was entitled to express an opinion as to
whether the child had been sexually abused), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989); State v.
Geyman, 729 P.2d 475, 479 (Mont. 1986) (holding that expert testimony that helps
the jury to assess the credibility of a child victim of sexual abuse is admissible); Townsend v. State, 734 P.2d 705, 708 (Nev. 1987) (allowing admission of an expert's opin-

2054

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:2030

CONCLUSION

Society's recent focus of attention toward the disturbing increase in reports of child sexual abuse has compelled our legal system to confront the evidentiary problems inherent in the
prosecution of child sexual abuse cases. 1 ' Unfortunately, the reforms that center upon resolving these issues are in themselves
problematic. It is often the case that a revision that seeks to alleviate the trauma suffered by victims and their families, or that attempts to permit the prosecution to use the evidence most valuable
to its case, is in conflict with the rights that the accused is entitled
to under the United States Constitution. 1 6 Therefore, courts and
lawmakers must be extremely cautious in their efforts to assuage
the difficulties associated with the special nature of child sexual
abuse cases.'

17

ion as to whether a child has been sexually abused); State v. Timperio, 528 N.E.2d
594, 596 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (permitting an expert witness to offer opinions as to
whether a particular child has been sexually abused); State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d
271, 275, 276 (S.D. 1989) (citations omitted) (holding that expert testimony comparing the victim's behavior with symptoms found in other victims of child sexual abuse
admissible where the expert does not testify that the victims were absolutely telling
the truth or were molested by the defendant).
For commentators' attempts to classify the range of decisions concerning the use
of expert testimony regarding common behaviors of victims of child sexual abuse, see
Elizabeth MacEwen & Peter Tamigi, A Three ProngApproach to the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome, 2 ST. JoHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 140 (1987)
(dividing state court decisions on whether experts should be permitted to offer opinion testimony concerning the credibility of sexually abused children into three categories: conservative, moderate, and liberal); Serrato, supra note 96 (dividing the use
of expert testimony along a scale of admissibility).
115 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (offering statistical data on the modern increase in reported incidents of child sexual abuse); supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (discussing the problems inherent in the prosecution of child sexual
abuse cases).
116 Allowing children to testify via closed circuit television and the creation of a
hearsay exception directed toward child victims' out-of-court statements of abuse are
particularly troublesome because they may interfere with defendants' right to confront their accusers under the Confrontation Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See
supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional limitations
upon permitting children to testify outside of the courtroom); supra notes 47-54 and
accompanying text (addressing the constitutional standards applied to hearsay exceptions specifically tailored to the out-of-court statements of child sexual abuse victims).
117 For example, the NewJersey Supreme Court noted:
Society must tread a measured path that avoids ignoring the reality of
child sexual abuse and avoids as well the possibility of unjust conviction
of this most shameful of crimes. In Maryland v. Craig... four members
of the Supreme Court cautioned that courts should be particularly insistent in protecting innocent defendants in child-sexual-abuse cases because of the reliability problems created by children's suggestibility in
child-sexual-abuse prosecutions.
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The New Jersey judiciary and legislature have successfully addressed the unique problems and issues that arise in child sexual
abuse cases by creating a careful balance among the interests of the
victims of child sexual abuse and their families, the interest of the
state in prosecuting crimes involving child sexual abuse, and the
constitutional rights of defendants. First, the legislature has effectively resolved the difficulties that result from the child victim's fear
of the accused by enacting a statute that permits the child's testimony to be presented outside of the courtroom when specific requirements are met.1 8 The statutory requirements assure that the
constitutional rights of defendants will not be violated. 19 Also, the
judiciary and the legislature have worked together to develop a
hearsay exception that allows children's out-of-court statements
concerning abuse to be admitted into evidence under certain circumstances.1 20 Again, the requisite balance has been created to
ensure that the state may admit what is usually its strongest evidence of abuse only when the constitutional rights of the accused
have been adequately protected. 121 Finally, the New Jersey judiciary has protected the truth-seeking role of the trial by carefully inspecting the nature and reliability of expert psychological evidence
22
and determining its proper function at trial.1
Child sexual abuse is an emotionally-charged issue. Given the
atrocious nature of crimes that involve child sexual abuse, it is understandable that states may choose to address the problems inherent in prosecuting these cases in ways that may threaten the
constitutional rights of the accused. Yet, the ways in which New
Jersey's legal system has confronted the problems of prosecuting
child sexual abuse cases demonstrate that these difficulties can be
alleviated without jeopardizing defendants' rights under the ConState v.J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 562, 617 A.2d 1196, 1200 (1993) (citing Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836, 868 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
118 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1993). For a discussion of
§ 2A:84A-32.4 and its text, see supra notes 19, 28-35, and accompanying text.
119 See State v. Crandall, 120 N.J. 649, 656, 577 A.2d 483, 486 (1990) (analyzing the
constitutionality of § 2A:84A-32.4 under the requirements set forth by the Supreme
Court in Craig). For a discussion of CrandaU,see supra notes 28-31 and accompanying
text.
120 See State v. D.RI, 109 N.J. 348, app. 378, 537 A.2d 667, app. 682-83 (1988); N.J.
Evid. R. 63(33), NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A (West Supp. 1993); N.J.R.E. 803(c) (27).
121 For a discussion of the constitutionality of Rule 63(33), see supra notes 55-64
and accompanying text.
122 See State v.J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 578-79, 617 A.2d 1196, 1209 (1993) (citing Myers
et al., supra note 98, at 67-68 (footnotes omitted)). For a detailed discussion of the
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. IQ, see supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
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stitution. The steps taken by the New Jersey judiciary and legislature to confront the evidentiary problems arising in child sexual
abuse cases should serve as an example to other jurisdictions of
how necessary reforms may be adequately addressed within the
confines of the American legal system.
Dione Marie Enea

